GLOBALISATION, ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP AND INDIA’S INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENTALISM

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The notion of citizenship is one of a set of ideas, emanating from the enlightenment, which were introduced to India in order to legitimise colonial domination. The concept of citizenship was subsumed under the imperial regime of extractive capitalism until late on in the colonial period, but other enlightenment ideas, particularly that of the nation, supplied the intellectual basis for India’s political and economic emancipation. Through the nationalist movement, then, the relationship between the individual and the state was nurtured. In exploring its Post-Independence and contemporary domestic and global evolution and the practices of economic citizenship, we have an analytical lens through which to examine selective exclusion from India’s state developmentalism - for there is nothing more basic either to development or to the state than citizenship. In the first part of this essay we discuss the concepts of citizenship and economic citizenship before turning in the second part to their practice.

Part One: Concepts

Citizenship

The journey of the ideas and practice of economic citizenship follows that of citizenship pure and simple. In the classic formulation of the great sociologist T.H. Marshall one state form is central to citizenship. It is a liberal and democratic state that can guarantee the three kinds of rights he saw permitting universal participation in social life – which is how Marshall saw citizenship. These are civil rights (covering all individuals irrespective of their social status); political rights and duties (formally encoded in written form and extending over a sovereign territory) and social rights (the basics of ‘human development’, the freedom from the Great Wants, and access to the means of social protection and

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assistance). If these rights are incomplete those excluded will not exercise full citizenship, a process conceived by Marshall as long and conflictual. Marshall argued that the acquisition, possession and defence of these rights are inextricably related to social class.

Even if these rights were to be universally guaranteed however, it does not follow that the mutual obligation of citizens to participate in political and economic life is guaranteed. Marshall’s argument is open to the rejoinder that since ‘the state’ cannot require even full citizens to work, other mechanisms, notably ‘the market’, are needed to incentivise and discipline this behaviour. The market however, while rewarding work, cannot guarantee employment. Nor can it maintain equal or just distributive outcomes. It does not confer status irrespective of a citizen’s position in the economy. Over and above spectacular crises and market failures, the market may – and does routinely – generate oppressive wage-work, the miniaturisation (rather than polarisation) of production and trade, labour displacement and the production of a class of under- and un-employed people. Some scholars see economic activity of this ‘adversely incorporated’ kind as being residual and the informal economy which it creates as being of importance only to this excluded underclass, even conceived as a reserve army eking out subsistence under duress and distress. Partha Chatterjee has controversially coined the term political society for the excluded mass. But in India the informal economy has been estimated at 60% of GDP, 93% of livelihoods and is rising. It is the mass. The majority of this mass is self-employed. While all the poor work in the informal economy not all members of the informal economy are poor. All however have incomplete rights and responsibilities. The point for theory is that while citizenship involves the exercise of both responsibilities as well as rights, in this liberal framework, rights – and thus the state - must logically and historically precede responsibilities. The state alone can set the parameters for economic participation, including taking responsibility for the limits of its own control and for the conditions under which political citizens are economically active.

Marshall’s argument is also open to the second comment that the citizen, in exercising rights and responsibilities, is thought of as an independent individual. But the reproduction of society requires socially constructed

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3 For Beveridge, these were hunger, sickness, ignorance, squalor (lack of shelter and sanitation) and unemployment.
4 See the discussion in Kymlicka and Norman, 1994
5 Chatterjee 2008 – see Economic and Political Weekly November 18th 2008 for several critical rejoinders.
6 For the former view see Altvater 1993; for the latter statistics see Harriss-White, 2003
relations of dependence (generally within a family) at various stages of the bio-social life cycle. Those who are rendered dependent (such as elderly people, children and, in most societies, women) and who are able to participate in society only through economic relationships mediated by others also have rights as citizens. For them too, rights must logically and historically precede responsibilities. But the responsibilities of states are often mediated through other social relations, often male-biased ones.

From both of these qualifications, it then follows that rights and responsibilities may not only be construed formally (and in general and abstract terms) but are also instituted in specific social and political forms and expressed through many kinds of social and cultural power and domination such that citizens may be marginalized not only through economic exclusion and expulsion but also through cultural identity. In masking the specifics of identity, universalist conceptions of citizenship privilege a notion and a condition of citizenship which may not exist in reality.

**Economic Citizenship**

The concept of economic citizenship has aspired to this universalism, embodying the rights to work (to be employed) and have the means to consume, to invest and be entrepreneurial and the obligation to be taxed. However, while the liberal concept of political citizenship guarantees a formal equality to all, economic citizenship is not a concept of equality; and an economy can and frequently does function without democratic politics. So there are tensions behind this deceptively simple definition. Here we consider three.

First, economic participation as an employee (the ‘capacity to work hard’\(^9\)) is on unequal terms with that of an employer of labour – for to work hard for a wage is to be exploited. The International Labour Office has developed the concepts and content of work into a normative project of individual and group rights which provide a floor to exploitation. This is the project of Decent Work. Not only does Decent Work require a right to work, there should also be rights at work (labour standards and safety), rights to organise (the collective right to engage as workers in ‘social dialogue’) and the individual right to social security.\(^{10}\) The concept of Decent Work is ‘one of reasonableness and sufficiency’. The ILO’s

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7. The focus of citizenship remains male biased.
8. White, 2002
10. ILO, 1999; Rodgers 2007
international activist project requires the ‘definition of new categories of individual and collective rights’… But even ‘(t)his increasing standardisation… is still a long way off from being backed up by national processes for legal classification and actual implementation.’ Serious obstacles further prevent ‘concepts such as decent work becoming operative’. They prevent ‘legal elements which force employers in all countries to provide certain minimum work conditions’ from being implemented and ‘governments (from being) determined to create public policies for social development’ (Rodgers, 2007). Nevertheless, ILO member countries such as India are engaged with the normative project of advancing and evaluating Decent Work.11

Second, the means to consume requires the rights to social support and welfare in times of need and of lack of work. These are Marshall’s ‘social rights’ but they affect the quality and supply of labour to the economy. For full economic citizenship, individuals must have the right to be economically dependent provided they fulfil certain socially determined conditions (see Pfetsch, here for Europe). Among citizens, these generally pertain to an incapacity to work due to age (young or old), physiological status, physical and mental disability, health status and the absence of work opportunities. The parameters of incapacity are not universal but are social constructs. Effective rights are also socially constructed - and change over time – in order to ration eligibility to economic dependence according to the state’s resources. As Binda Sahni and Niraja Gopal Jayal have both recently shown in the context of migration, the Indian state can and does produce a class of non-citizen within the territory - politically as well as economically right-less people who are prevented from being eligible for welfare. The process is far from being confined to the Indian state but is widespread - even if it involves a small proportion of a given society’s population.12

Third, goaded in the west by the emphasis on political citizenship as a process of active exercise of rights,13 the concept of economic citizenship has developed and solidified into an agenda for entrepreneurship, wealth creation and adaptability to economic and technological change. The active economic citizen should be self-supporting:14 Pfetsch shows here (chapter ****) that one of the rights of a European citizen is the right to do business. From the USA and Europe the concept is actively flowing

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11 Ghose, 2008
12 Sahni, 2009; Jayal, forthcoming. See Spiess here. See also Harriss-White 2005 a and b on the joint production and criminalisation of destitution by both state and society.
13 See Mitra, Manor, Speiss and Pfetsch here ****
14 Kymlicka and Norman, 1994
‘south’ in the outreach initiatives of corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship. For instance, the Full Economic Citizen (FEC) initiative, based in the USA, is promoting ‘a new way of thinking about housing, healthcare and small producers, one that seeks to enable business-social alliances or Hybrid Value Chains to develop products, distribution channels and financing solutions to better serve these undeserved (sic) markets’…where ‘over 2 billion citizens.. do not have access to any type of financial services, (and) one billion still live in inadequate housing… ’ (Ashoka, nd). FEC is a private international aid project linking economic citizenship with human development and basic needs.

In the UK, economic citizenship is a concept of economic literacy of a particular kind. In the school curriculum and syllabus for ages 14 to 16, when young people are formally socialised for work, economic citizenship requires knowledge of private pensions and money management, competition and prices the creation of a business plan, the concept of the unique selling point, advertising and marketing, ethics (tensions between competition, labour standards, consumer rights and the environment), globalisation, outsourcing and labour costs, creditworthiness and loans, rights (to be explored if the pupil can find work experience), concepts of growth and recession, and taxation and expenditure by the state (Institute for Citizenship 2002). The normative context is the capitalist economy. Here, the Asian ‘other’ appears as a threat to competitive advantage. ‘Fair trade’ is stated in the introduction to be a ‘key concept’ that is ‘missed out’ in the syllabus. So is the work of family-makers. Scant attention is paid to the organisation of wage workers and yet the active economic citizen will rarely be an employer and most commonly be a wage worker.

These concepts and practices flowing from OECD heartlands clearly involve ‘full’ participation in a market economy. While planned, command, or socialist economies might provide decent work, social sector provisioning and basic needs, they do not fulfil the requirements of active individual entrepreneurship in liberal democratic states. Nor can non-market economic arrangements in societies based on reciprocity and subsistence provide access to ‘financial instruments to leverage asset creation’ (Ashoka, nd). But the market economy does not exist in the abstract. The mode of organisation, production and distribution of surplus is capitalist. Let us remind ourselves of its logic and dynamic.

A capitalist market economy rests on a relation with natural resources which are not free goods but await their being given value through
technology and human labour. The state supplies the pre-conditions for this to take place, among which are non-commodifiable provisions such as infrastructure and the means of communications. Capital requires a state to guarantee property rights, and to secure the key institutions through which resources are extracted\textsuperscript{15} and mobilised (but not - under capitalism - restituted). It requires the production of labour, the health and capabilities of which are created outside the circuits of capitalism – generally through the state and the family. The state has to ensure that labour is freed to be employed and to struggle for its own interests, that commodities are produced for profit and profit for reinvestment, that money expands using interest and that technology is developed and capitalised. Opposition has to be confronted, destroyed or bought off and victims annihilated or compensated.\textsuperscript{16} A matrix of state and non-state institutions forms a structure to stabilise the process of accumulation.\textsuperscript{17} Not only do these institutional preconditions have to be created, they also have to be maintained by the state against threats to them.

Like economic citizenship, capitalist accumulation is also bound in contradictions: relations that are essential to its functioning but opposed to each other. The most politicised is that between capital and labour but there are others: between [capital and labour] and nature; between [production and consumption] and reproductive / free time. \textsuperscript{18} As a result, since the establishment of political, civil and cultural citizenship is also a historical and contested process through which obligations and rights develop, economic citizenship is a contested process.\textsuperscript{19} Institutions have to be fought for by those with material interests in equality in order to be brought into existence, and once in existence they have actively to be defended, in order to be maintained in the public interest. Economic citizens are never fully and equally guaranteed by the liberal democratic state. Inevitably sectors of society are disenfranchised and unable to exercise political and social rights in general and to participate on equal terms in markets in particular.

An alternative normative project of economic citizenship would establish deliberate political and social arrangements which guarantee the primacy of the economic rights discussed above, ensure fairness and equality in

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{15} There has been a resurgence of recent interest in the process of land seizure: contemporary manifestations of the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ that has actually been ongoing in India since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (see Chatterjee, 2008; Khan 2004).
\item\textsuperscript{16} Khan 2004
\item\textsuperscript{17} McDonough, 2007; Harriss-White, 2003
\item\textsuperscript{18} See James O Connor, 1996; Panayatokis 2007
\item\textsuperscript{19} It requires the creation of mechanisms to ensure obligation, to claim rights, to claim redress for non-provision, to adjudicate claims and enforce the results of that adjudication (see Alston, 1994, for the context of the right to food).
\end{itemize}
outcomes, sustainable metabolic balances and the willingness of citizens to exercise ‘restraint in economic demands’.. and ‘delays to self gratification’. It would accept – but also check - cultural differences which if unchecked will exclude or incorporate people in an adverse manner. A normative project would protect citizens from exclusion from the economy on that account.

But in a market economy, in a capitalist economy, such a project can only be triggered and advanced by increments through the concerted agency of the state and of political citizens working through civil society. The outline of such a project is out of the scope of this essay but is attempted elsewhere. In what follows we turn explicitly to India’s performance in building economic citizenship. Rather than analyse the lively marketplace of discourse that is relevant to economic citizenship but does not use the concept, we evaluate recent material progress towards economic citizenship under the prevailing capitalist order. First we examine the roles and relationships of state, market and civil society in constructing and contesting economic citizenship at an All-India level. We then turn to one particular state as a case study. This then enables us to look outwards to analyse the conceptual categories and material progress of Indian economic citizenship under globalisation.

**Part Two Practice**

**The Indian context 1: The role of the state in economic citizenship**

The liberal democratic Indian state has responded to the dual process of rapid capitalist transformation on the one hand and democratic assertion through electoral politics on the other with institutions that arguably regulate the economy more fruitfully than those which regulate democratic politics. It has also created a social structure for accumulation - a structure of rents - more successfully than it has developed a framework for Decent Work conditions for labour or a structure of redistributive transfers. Since the achievement of significant grain surpluses in the mid 1970s, the secular and expert apparatus of development planning has addressed unequal economic citizenship through a plethora of programmes and projects labelled in every conceivable way (by income, agro-ecological region, farm size, gender, life-cycle, caste/ethnicity, skill level, nutritional status etc). But

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20 Kymlicka and Norman 1994 p 394
21 See Manor here (*****)
22 Prakash and Harriss-White 2009.
23 See Schoettli here (*****)
24 Let alone fair and equal outcomes. See Harriss-White 2003; 2007; Prakash and Harriss-White, 2009
throughout this process while the discourse of planning has adhered to a universal norm of citizenship, the practices of inclusion have been under-funded, re-interpreted by local state bureaucracies, captured by the formally non-eligible, and ‘transformed beyond recognition’ in implementation such that although practical outcomes vary according to the local balance of social and political forces, they tend to reinforce unequal economic citizenship.

Tax cultures of non-compliance, capital flight and money laundering, relations of rent-seeking, corruption, buy-off, the commodification of policy-making and the development of a complex architecture of rent protection and conflicts of interest within the state have weakened its legitimacy and the disciplinary / enforcement capacity in a way that privileges capital over labour. Until very recently they have also starved the state of resources and qualify its competence - even the necessary competence to regulate capital. As a result the state is embedded in the same cultures of identity and class relations that are manifest in society and the economy. Instead of the rationalities of state bureaucracy and planning harnessed to the logic of the market, which jointly work to dissolve archaic social relations, these forms of authority are reworked to serve the function of economic regulation. They also pervade the practices of the state. They trespass across the boundary between the state and society. As a result, the state is not able to exercise autonomy in the project of economic citizenship. Indeed, a parallel ‘shadow’ state develops with its own political arrangements which must also include shadow economic citizenship. The political citizen’s access to mechanisms for the redress of infringements of rights or to enforce the ensuing judgements is also compromised - for some, systematically and severely.

Within the last five years, faced with controversy over the extent that brute poverty has been reduced, but with hard evidence of widening inequality and severe and persistent multidimensional poverty among

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25 Kaviraj, 1988; Harriss-White 2008; Fernandez, 2008
26 Not only is over 40% of the Indian economy black but also at least 5% disappears each year in capital flight mainly through the over-invoicing of exports and under-invoicing of imports - at a huge opportunity cost (Kumar, 1999; Srinivasan, 2007)
27 Roy, 1996, used what remains the latest available data to reveal that the leakages from the state due to corruption are one twentieth those due to tax evasion. Tax revenues are at the time of writing (2010) growing more slowly than GDP. While the tax base is increasing, excise duty and corporation tax have fallen short of the 2009-10 budget target (Mukherjee 2010).
28 As confidently predicted by social theorists such as Weber, Myrdal and the founding fathers of modern Indian sociology (for example Madan and Srinivas) see Harriss-White 2003.
29 Khan 2004; Prakash 2010; Sud, 2007; Banik 2007
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, a set of watchdog commissions have been established and certain new legal entitlements have been granted - through the political projects of a ‘Common Minimum Programme’ and later ‘Inclusive Development’. The most notable declared responsibilities are for minorities, backward classes, women, scheduled castes and tribes, for enterprises in the unorganised sector and the problem of agricultural debt; and the most notable achievements have been the right to information, the right to education bill, the rural health mission, the proposed Food Security Act and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The NREGA can be taken as paradigmatic but the entire inclusive development project needs putting into the context of much greater state resources and activism in the privatisation of public services, the creation of autonomous jurisdictions in special export zones (SEZs), the easing of foreign investment, the creation of competition policy, the re-regulation of electricity, telecoms, equity and insurance, investment finance and credit (Appendix 1).

After years of political campaigning, the REGA of 2005-6 guarantees 100 days of work per year and is the first step towards the ILO’s right to work and the Indian constitution’s directive principle of the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Implemented in all districts from 2008 for self-selected participants, it is a notable step towards economic citizenship. In the absence of a national evaluation, Reddy and Upendranath have synthesised the large literature about the NREG scheme (2009). The economic citizenship impacts with which this essay is concerned involve employment, poverty reduction and the programme’s effect on political citizenship. Through water conservation, roadwork and repairs and afforestation, significant improvements in the employment and self-respect of agricultural labour, women scheduled castes and tribes have been reported. In some regions a collective work ethos is (re)emerging. However, regions where citizens with these attributes are most concentrated have performed least well. NREG income has indeed been spent on food, healthcare costs and the repayment of debt. It has empowered some workers to avoid hazardous alternative work. However only 7% of households got their entitlement of 100 days’ employment. Other attributes include the flouting of minimum wages, abuse by unauthorised private labour contractors and caste discrimination. The scheme has been implemented through local

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30 See the summary of evidence in Sengupta, Kannan and Raveendran, 2008
31 Article 39 and 41 of the Indian Constitution.
32 SCs are 216% of the Indian population and supply 29% of all days of work in 2009; STs are 8% and perform 25% of work-days; women are 32% of the labour force but make up 48% of the workforce on the NREG programme (Reddy and Upendranath, 2009 pp7-10).
33 The average is 48/100 days (Reddy and Upendranath, 2009).
government institutions of political participation and empowerment; but they have been notably short staffed, unable to prevent delays in wage payments or to provide decent sanitation and child care. Other reported problems include lack of a mechanism of redressal for complaints, lack of co-ordination with other state development schemes, idiosyncratic interpretations of the rules and an absence monitoring and evaluation. To date, noteworthy impacts on political participation are few. Wide variations in performance conceal well-implemented schemes in Rajasthan – due to the gingering of NGOs – and in AP and Kerala – due to the active involvement of women’s collective Self Help Groups. So, just as Marshall theorised, the process of economic empowerment of citizens continues to be a protracted and uneven process, fraught with disputes.

The Indian Context 2: The Role of Markets in Economic Citizenship

As an allocative mechanism the market is not neutral between individuals who are unequally endowed. The market responds to the signals of relative prices and effective demand - which are a direct manifestation of social class and its income distribution - not to rights. It responds to the logic of profit and shareholder value, not to equity or inclusive justice. Indian markets are capitalist markets, transferring the price signals for production, reallocating resources between sectors of the economy and - even in restrictively defined markets in which goods are bought, sold and brokered - insofar as they incorporate transport, storage and processing - being theatres of exploitation in their own right. They produce commodities by means of commodities. They must expand in two ways, first, through competition, the oppression of labour and technological change which reduces the costs of production and second, through commodification (involving new commodities and commodified services, the commodification of the public sphere, public space, the domestic sphere, the commons including carbon dioxide and human genes). Capitalist markets develop through the concentration of capital (through economies of scale and economies of risk-minimising portfolio development) as well as through the centralisation of capital alongside the decentralisation of production (through subcontracting and outsourcing in order to minimise costs with or without technical change, to shed risks and avoid regulation by the state). They require a distribution of qualities of ‘human development’ for the social reproduction of labour - in turn either for direct employment or for indirect control through self-employment. And this takes place through an array of institutions and practices of authority and domination that operate outside as well as
inside the cycles of production in the economy. These institutions do not operate according to the logic of capital, but are indispensable to it.  

It follows from this that the economy – the ‘market’ - is often regulated by social custom more than by state law. As we saw with the NREG scheme above, custom often informs the practice of state law. Both capital and labour are segmented not only in the process of formation of social classes but also through structures and institutions of identity: notably gender, caste, ethnicity, religion, locality, language and age. Women are found to enter the paid work force disproportionately as casual agricultural labour. Persistent discrimination is practised not only against women but also against Dalits, Scheduled Tribes and many Minorities. Productivity is increased in low-equilibrium production conditions through the lengthening of the working day and downwards pressure on wages. The regulative institutions of the state are prey to capture by fractions of capital and regulative authority is privatised. Economic citizenship is class structured and incomplete in ways that are complex and historically specific.

The Indian Context 3: the Role of Civil Society in Sustaining and Challenging Violations of Economic Citizenship

Three kinds of role may be distinguished. All are formal and informal, open and hidden.

First, with respect to the formal role of civil society, despite a massive wave of assertion by dalits and other oppressed people through the means of party politics, the achievement of an increased space for political pluralism (the expression of a diversity of interests) has not yet been translated into an economic project of inclusion or social plurality. The regional parties, given an electoral mandate to question the regional and social marginalisation which resulted from rule by the formerly dominant political parties, have succeeded much better politically than they have in relation to the economy.

Second, new social movements have organised to demand the inclusion of social groups left out of both state-led as well as market-based development. They lay claim to economic citizenship with the guarantee of the livelihood resources currently at their command and threatened by

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34 Harriss-White, 2003; Wolf 2007
35 Gooptu and Harriss-White 2000;
36 Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999;
37 Kapadia 2010, Heyer 2010, Lerche, 2007; Shariff 2006, Thorat 2998
38 Cadene and Holmstrom, 1999; Roman, 2008; Ruthven 2008
39 Basile, 2009; Chibber 2003
development-induced displacement (e.g. Narmada Bachao Aandolan, many movements against SEZs, etc.\textsuperscript{40}) On the other hand, powerful political agitations (for instance, Gujjars who are incorporated into the market-based accumulation process - in Rajasthan, Haryana, and UP in 2008\textsuperscript{41}), now demand new guarantees through Reservation under the category of Scheduled Tribe in order to gain access to state-supported livelihood opportunities and development resources.

Third, the informal role of civil society has involved the strengthening of religion and caste in what Satish Saberwal called the ‘cellular’ organisation of civil society. This has accentuated relations both of passive exclusion and active expulsion. Meanwhile structural violence\textsuperscript{42} constitutes a threat to economic non-citizens (or partial citizens), who have been excluded or expelled from party politics as well as from the politics of social movements and NGOs.\textsuperscript{43}

**The Case of Political and Economic Citizenship in Arunachal**

Since the colonial period, India’s frontier hills have been regarded as the ‘master oppositional binary’ to the plains.\textsuperscript{44} But the state of Arunachal, formed as late as 1986, may better be seen as an exceptional lens through which its unusual powers to define and protect citizenship points up the very different processes to which adivasis are subject elsewhere - particularly in central India. Arunachal is unusual both in being militarised (on the frontier between China, Burma and Bhutan), in being still widely regarded as ‘a territorial exterior of the theatre of capital’, as belonging outside the era of the law\textsuperscript{45} in its differentiated and asymmetrical formal structures of political, social and economic citizenship.

The Arunachali state formally and informally enforces a differentiated citizenship, while elsewhere in India a weak state wrecks formal efforts to protect adivasis. While religion, caste, gender, language and trade associations regulate the informal economy throughout India, it is ethnic identity that plays a paramount role in economic citizenship in Arunachal. Ethnicity is our lens. Arunachal however is not a territorial exterior for the theatre of capital. The new state is undergoing very rapid economic

\textsuperscript{40} See for one example [http://lalgarh.wordpress.com/2009/12/13/all-india-convention-against-sez-land-grabbing-displacement/](http://lalgarh.wordpress.com/2009/12/13/all-india-convention-against-sez-land-grabbing-displacement/)

\textsuperscript{41} Rajalakshmi, 2008

\textsuperscript{42} Zizek 2008

\textsuperscript{43} Sarkar, 2009; Sahni, 2009

\textsuperscript{44} Baruah, 2008

\textsuperscript{45} Kar, 2008 in Baruah 2008.
transformation in which, while it is relatively cut off from global communications, it is integrated by effective demand into markets for consumer goods produced in India, China and SE Asia.\textsuperscript{46}

The formal structures of citizenship derive from three kinds of political process which may be found – though not together – in other parts of India. First, protective positive discrimination for indigenous people (Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes, of which there are over a hundred in a population of over a million). This is enforced by the state. Second, the structure of economic and political rights which is highly differentiated and unequal is enforced in the ‘de facto ethnic homelands’ simultaneously through plural spheres of state law and customary procedure, discussed below. Districts are geographically huge but small entities in terms of population with a correspondingly miniaturised local politics. Third, de facto (informal) discrimination is practised against non-local Indian citizens who have lived in the territory of Arunachal since long before it was a state. Four conditions of discrimination have been researched: first, the cases of tribal people of the Chakma and Hajong;\textsuperscript{47} second, the cases of migrant labour – often adivasi – from other Indian states; third, non-local, non-Indian working people (Bangladeshis and Nepalis) and fourth, weaker local APST citizens.\textsuperscript{48} This discrimination is enforced outside legal / customary institutions through power politics. As Baruah has recently concluded, this structure of discrimination has led to a ‘permanent crisis of citizenship.. a major structural dilemma for the post-colonial practice of citizenship. The idiom …penalises those that the commodity economy dynamises. Those who are mobile are either penalised as being defined as outsiders, or mobility is discouraged because privileges that go with ST status are made specific to habitats to which particular groups are fixed.’\textsuperscript{49}

Non-Arunachali Indian citizens have highly restricted rights to land and to property; to work (whether self employed, in a one-generation family business or in wage work), access to which is discretionary depends not only on having an Inner Line Permit from the Government of India\textsuperscript{50} but also on the decision of the local District Commissioner. Non-Arunachali citizens of India also cannot own trade or business establishments or do business with the government of Arunachal. Outsiders and their descendents remain foreigners. Even when a male outsider marries an

\textsuperscript{46} Govt of Arunachal Pradesh, 2006; Salam, 2007
\textsuperscript{47} Sahni, 2009
\textsuperscript{48} Harriss-White, Mishra and Upadhyay, 2009
\textsuperscript{49} Baruah, 2008 p16
\textsuperscript{50} The Inner Line is as much a colonial artefact as the classification of hills and plains tribes. It was originally established in 1873 from when on it has been challenged.
APST their children are not full citizens of AP. Outsiders, including such children, have highly restricted rights\textsuperscript{51} to all posts in the state bureaucracy, except for the highest class of office (Class I) where there is 80% reservation for local people. They have correspondingly restricted rights to living quarters, promotions and other benefits. Outsiders from elsewhere in India have restrictions on scholarships for education, on their rights to social security and to pensions. By virtue of the prevailing land relations, development finance is inaccessible as well.

Despite these political categories being ‘leaky vessels’\textsuperscript{52} class formation, income and wealth are structured by these restrictions. Local processes of social differentiation have created little outright proletarianisation and the very small agrarian capitalist class is dominated by rentier production relations, but there is a wage labour force working in both agriculture and the non-agrarian economy which has migrated from other states of India, from Nepal and Bangladesh, employed and socially quarantined under poor and oppressive conditions. Migrant wage labour has no economic (or social or political) rights. They are economic non-citizens. The non-farm economy – mainly comprising the sphere of distribution and trade - is controlled by capitalists from outside the state, mostly NW India. Constrained by being excluded from ownership of physical resources, profits of non-Arunachalis are repatriated, long term investment disincentivised and, where possible, wages are remitted-out. An APST elite lives from rents in a fourfold sense – renting out land, property and licences and seeking rents in a state apparatus which is resourced entirely through fiscal transfers from New Delhi.\textsuperscript{53}

What is more subtle is the differentiated economic citizenship of Arunachal’s indigenous people themselves. The local state vests rights in tribal collectives so that differentiation within the collective is formally masked, victims of gender exclusion cannot gain redress within the collective, and a tribal citizen of Arunachal Pradesh is less than equal outside the region of his native tribal group.\textsuperscript{54} The political and economic bargaining power of small / minor / (ex) slave tribes is weak and unequal. Since public policy is based by definition on group membership, the principle of individual citizenship and of democratic accountability to the individual is over-ridden. And religious, or chiefly authority may override collective equity. The rights of the income-poor are not represented in informal politics. There is no sign of the mobilisation of the poor. In

\textsuperscript{51} check none at all? DEEPAK
\textsuperscript{52} Jim Scott, 2000 (in Baruah, 2008 p17)
\textsuperscript{53} Harriss-White, Mishra and Upadhyay, 2009
\textsuperscript{54} See Harriss-White, Mishra and Updahaya, 2009 for evidence of the state’s denial of private property.
competitively politicised ethnicity, the long-term interests of disadvantaged people are locked into relations of patronage and clientelage through which resources are rationed. Meanwhile long-term adivasi residents may only shape claims to APST status through humiliating idioms of bio-cultural primitiveness.\textsuperscript{55}

In Arunachal Pradesh, to explain the process of economic citizenship in Marshallian class terms alone would be to miss the main social relations through which economic citizenship is construed – those of ethnicity.

\textit{Neo-liberal globalisation}

Under the current neo-liberal form taken by globalisation, national citizenship is losing ground to a new model sited within an increasingly de-territorialised notion of rights, in which the system of global governance within which to make them fully operational is again being developed in an incomplete and highly selective way. Meanwhile it is not simply WTO trade rules but also flows of money and commodities across political borders which impede the capacity of individual nation states to develop enforceable policies for the pursuit of nationally specific economic objectives. They also affect the capacity of states to raise resources to pursue redistributive social goals.\textsuperscript{56} The politics of markets shifts from direct state participation in the economy to new forms of ‘parametric’ regulation. Global tele-communications combine with separable and interdependent production processes controlled by IT in global value chains; the media, operating in synergy with diasporic communication and remittances - whether from the international workforce (as in the Middle East in India’s case) or from the professional elites (as in the US and UK case) - all create transnational allegiances, cultural hybrids and changed consumption patterns. These break down the capacity of states to claim an overriding form of authority. As a result, the identification of elites with the parent nation (either as ‘parent’ or as ‘nation’) weakens. And while a moral attachment may endure,\textsuperscript{57} the moral authority of both the state and the nation dissipates. These transnational developments add novel elements to the concept of citizenship.

Cultural citizenship will be cosmopolitanised by the norms of the country/ies of residence (whether expulsive or inclusive) as well as those of the country of origin – including those of Minorities, Dalits and others

\textsuperscript{55} Sahni, 2009
\textsuperscript{56} Harriss-White, 2002
\textsuperscript{57} What Benedict Anderson has called the ‘imagined community’.
whose citizenship rights in the country of origin are incomplete.\textsuperscript{58} Global citizenship is also being expanded to include the new concept of ecological citizenship and the rights and responsibilities of ‘citizens’ of a finite planet governed by laws of nature as well as those of politics.\textsuperscript{59}

Running through claims to citizenship in Western societies are two common themes. First, that the citizens’ claim is not on the state so much as on civil society. Second, that even when the state is the repository of obligation, the claim is made to para-statal agencies or super-national institutions of governance, so that enforcement capacity is mediated through more than one set of institutions. \textsuperscript{60} This is a socially specific, time-bound and politically constructed re-drawing of the concepts of citizenship which has been theoretically defined as multiculturalism. \textsuperscript{61} It is prone to contestation in paradoxical ways from economic nationalists who object to the political and cultural consequences of productivity-enhancing migrant labour and capital, and blame the vectors of multiculturalism for economic stresses which immigrants rarely actually do anything but relieve.

\textbf{Global Citizenship in India 1: the Political Economy}

India has witnessed sustained and differentiated economic growth, actively supported by the state. The benefits have been concentrated in the 45 million in the top 4\% of the income distribution gaining in excess of $10/day. By contrast, seventy per cent of the labour force brings home under Rs 20/day - less than half a dollar.\textsuperscript{62}

With respect to economic citizenship, India appears to be following a trajectory that differs from that of the West in several respects. First, it has membership of international organisations regulating trade and commerce, is the acknowledged leader of the developing world at the WTO and articulates the aspirations of developing countries in international negotiations on environment and energy. Second, Indian foreign direct investment has been characterised by a proliferation of mergers and acquisitions of elite businesses in Europe, Latin America the USA and Africa. Third, India supplies a crucial workforce to the Middle East. \textsuperscript{63} Fourth, India is economically powerful and politically influential

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Held, 1995
\item \textsuperscript{59} van Steenbergen, 1996
\item \textsuperscript{60} E.g. the EU or NAFTA
\item \textsuperscript{61} Parekh, 1997
\item \textsuperscript{62} Sengupta Kamnan and Raveendran, 2008; NCEUS, 2008
\item \textsuperscript{63} 70\% NRIs in the Gulf region are semi- or unskilled labour – men in construction and women in domestic service, neither of which sectors have any political clout.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
through its highly skilled migrants in top OECD countries (the USA, Canada, Australia and the UK) as well as newly industrialising countries (Malaysia, Singapore, UAE etc).

But this blurring of international boundaries has not resulted in a dilution of social / cultural citizenship in India. The globalisation of Indian capital has not affected national capital, if only because of the huge size of the domestic market. Most FDI in India itself has an Indian partner or is controlled by NRIs themselves, enabling the joint venture better to negotiate with the Indian state and the Indian state better to protect Indian capital in cases of adverse treatment by, or unacceptable competition from, international capital. These factors have contributed to what we think are more general patterns:

a) The economic forces unleashed by globalisation have generated parallel and contradictory processes. A very small proportion of Indian citizens are transnational let alone post-national. Their political strength results from their ability to use the Indian state to support their place in the market. While being post-national in the international arena they do not see reasons to challenge the practices of economic citizenship outlined earlier in this essay.

b) As elsewhere in the world so in India, the social authority of the nation over post national citizens has been considerably weakened. Despite this, the Indian diaspora, or workers of Indian origin, appeal to the political power of the Indian state to counter their experience of economic marginalisation (as in the case of Malaysia), poor labour conditions (the Gulf), or cultural rejection (e.g. the recent turban case in Canada) on the foreign shores where they reside and work. The Indian state confines the weight of its support to elite migrants.

c) There is strong demand for dual citizenship from the NRI diaspora, nurtured by ties of kinship and remittances. For many there is a contradiction between cultural marginalisation in their place of residence (against which they campaign) and citizenship based on cultural exclusion within India itself. Dual citizenship has been granted to NRIs from only 16 countries, none of which are those where Indian migrants are less or un-skilled wage labour.

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64 In medicine, engineering, law, finance, as well as IT  
65 These migrants interact with the domestic Indian economy through remittances (the greatest are from the Gulf not from the 2m carefully screened entrants to the USA (Pattanaik, 2007). N American NRIs have political clout in their destination country and active promotion in India.  
66 See Kim, 2008, on India’s protection of domestic capital in the liquor sector.  
67 See Sahni, 2009  
68 And like so many low status economic organisations within India (Basile, 2009)  
69 Jaffrelot
Global Citizenship in India 2: Politics and Civil Society

During this period of rapid and sustained growth, India has also witnessed democratic pressure from the lower deciles of the income distribution. At the same time, as discussed earlier, the state’s developmental and budgetary commitments to economically excluded social status groups – particularly Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims (and among them particularly women) – have risen but have not yet undone their relative and absolute poverty. Groups whose economic status is most imperfectly guaranteed have organised to articulate their deprivation on many platforms of international civil society and the UN.

At the Durban conference, Dalits made a forceful plea for the equation of caste discrimination with racial discrimination. Subsuming their many differences under a common political identity, they have made several representations to the UN Human Rights Commission, have built global networks with NGOs and civil society groups championing Ambedkar’s concept of dignity and have pressured the governments of other nations to examine discrimination inside India. The full citizenship rights demanded mean full economic citizenship. The demand is made not only against the state but also against the corporate sector.

In the same way Adivasis have made several representations to the UN Permanent Mission on Indigenous Issues with a set of demands revolving around economic inclusion combined with special constitutional status for their territories to protect not only their cultures and languages but also their economic resources. Their demands are made to the state.

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70 See Fernandez, 2008, for the technologies of bureaucratic power which account for such paradoxes. In the budgets for 2008–10 allocations for ‘Inclusive Development’ have all increased. In 2010 that for Minorities is planned at Rs 2.6k crores; for the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment Rs 4.5kcr; pensions for the unorganised sector Rs 0.1 kcr; womens’ self help groups Rs 0.4 kcr; social security for the unorganised sector Rs 1kcr; backward regions Rs 7.3kcr; rural and urban housing Rs 10 and 5.4kcr respectively; rural infrastructure Rs 48kcr; the NREGA Rs 40kcr; rural development Rs 66kcr; health Rs 22 kcr and education Rs 31 kcr. The social sector stood at 37% of total plan expenditure of Rs 373kcr and rural infrastructure at 25%. ‘Inclusive development is an act of faith’ (P. Mukherjee, 2010, para 72). But Indian growth continues to be polarising. Nearly 80% of the population continue to live on less than $2/day. According to Sengupta, Kannan and Raveendran (2008), while in 1993-4 the poor were 732m out of a total population of 894 m, ten years later they were 836 m out of 1090 m - a decline of only 5 percentage points. Among the poor 85% of Muslims and 87% of Scheduled Castes and Tribes live on under $2/day.

71 BBC News: Thursday, 6 September, 2001, 08:35 GMT 09:35 UK Indian groups raise caste question.

72 For instance a team of Conservative Party MPs prepared a report on discrimination against Dalits in India to be followed by a similar report from the Labour Party. See also the Dalit Solidarity Network UK. DalitWatch UK holds regular meetings in Portcullis House, the annexe of the House of Commons under the patronage of Labour MPs, mobilising public opinion to discrimination against dalits in British companies investing in India.

73 See www.dgroups.org/groups/Reservation4dalits/docs/thorat.doc
Muslims have made two parallel responses. The first, from the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, reiterates their commitment to Islam, understood as being inclusive as well as exclusive; expresses opposition to liberalisation because of its distributive impacts; relates American aggression to economic imperialism; and poses an Islamic economic system as a response, supports secularism understood as state neutrality towards religious communities and networks with Jamaat in Kashmir and in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Their conception of citizenship is universal, while based on Islam. Religion in this case is the basis for inclusion as well as exclusion.

Meanwhile India’s Muslim elite have reacted strongly to civil violence and to the international stereotyping of Muslims. With some exceptions, they have tended to withdraw from the public sphere, reinforced their political support for the most powerful party perceived to embody secular politics and strengthened national and global networks based on Islam. But they have not engaged in any sustained lobbying of the state for particular claims.

While the Indian ‘counterflow’ has contributed dynamically to global society it has not enriched the concept of economic citizenship. The non-party political assertion of Dalits has prioritised economic citizenship without using the concept. But it has neglected the ‘women’s question’ emanating from the intersection of relations of authority and domination due to caste, class and patriarchy. The development of adivasis requires a state commitment to privileging remote populations over the demands and needs of apex private national and international capital. The political mobilisation of Jamaat Muslims involves a conception of citizenship that would only be realised if the global and national economic systems were to be restructured. Nine of these processes of striving towards a more inclusive political citizenship have made much progress on economic inclusion.

**Summing-up**

Economic citizenship is not a concept about which there is consensus in definition. It is not a concept native native to India.\(^4\) Nor is it an imported concept that has yet put down roots. Nonetheless India’s state has for decades been planning for the economic inclusion of adversely incorporated citizens through a mass of anti-poverty, participatory, empowering and labour market interventions in the spheres of production

\(^{74}\) Although Nayak, here, (****) shows that tribal Orissan society had a notion of citizenship, this is not one of economic citizenship.
and social reproduction. It has also left nine tenths of all livelihoods outside the scope of its regulative reach. In this essay we have therefore interrogated the contested process of economic citizenship by translating conceptual proxies and by examining the practices of civil society and market as well as those of the state.

India’s far from complete processes of domestic economic citizenship - perhaps at their most formally and informally complex in Arunachal - shape its economic and social differentiation. Ethnicity has been the lens through which the process has been observed in our case study here; but caste, religion, gender, locality and other kinds of identity cannot be ignored as regulators of the economy either. These then affect the politics of global economic citizenship.

The concept of economic citizenship, framed in terms of markets, ignores the implications for citizenship of these markets being capitalist. Economic citizenship is being forged by the same social forces as are developing capitalism. The state’s practical obligations to the entitlements of registered capital contrast with its idiosyncratic relations of citizenship for the vast mass of informal wage workers and petty commodity producers.

Economic citizenship has a long way to go in India - only a minority are free to exercise individual choice. There are constituent states where non-local Indian political citizens have barely any economic rights at all and where national territorial security is guaranteed by the manual labour of incoming migrant road-workers, many of who are illegal and have no rights whatsoever. The Indian state has made a start on the right to work, it neglects rights at work and it confines rights to social security to the labour aristocracy. It focuses, if there is pattern at all, on contingent rights to a plethora of interventions, made ever more arbitrary by the agency of NGOs, that cover some of the conditions of social reproduction outside work. The NREG scheme which we discussed here is not exceptional in its funding, it is exceptional in addressing production and work. In a Marshallian perspective these contingent rights are simply part of the incompleteness of the processes of citizenship. But both their incompleteness and their asymmetry are consistent with the requirements of India’s informal capitalism. Differentiated economic citizenship is not independent of the processes leading to other kinds of citizenship - where it appears from surveys of Indian political citizenship that the process is

75 Even the NREGA which has been interpreted as a right provides a right to 100 days of work and has been implemented unevenly with under half the resources it needs, NCEUS, 2008.
much further advanced. Differentiated economic citizenship is subversive of political citizenship.

Now the state, markets and civil society must not only deal with challenges from its emigrant capital (visible and invisible) and from immigrant capital, from trans- and post-national as well as Hindu-national émigré professional classes and emigrant working people along with the demands of incoming global business, communications, politics and civil society. Some of these incoming forces bear projects of economic citizenship nurtured in the very different conditions of OECD countries. India’s state, markets and civil society must also deal with the painful anti-developmental processes structured by class and status identity - and exemplified by newly visible land seizures and displacement of tribal people as cities, towns, expressways and industrial zones explode outwards and as national and multinational capital sizes up mineral resources. These processes result from, and also contribute to, highly unequal and incomplete economic citizenship domestically.

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76 Mitra, here *****
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## Appendix I: Institutions Supporting Economics of Market and Politics of Democracy

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<th>Market Regulating Institutions</th>
<th>Market Legitimising Institutions</th>
<th>Institutions Giving a Call for Inclusive Development</th>
<th>Watch dog</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Investment (FIIA)</td>
<td>Foreign Investment Implementation Authority</td>
<td>The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission</td>
<td>National Investment Fund</td>
<td>National Advisory Council (now defunct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Attract new players.</td>
<td>Committee on Infrastructure</td>
<td>The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India</td>
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<td>The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission</td>
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<td>National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector</td>
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*Note: The table above lists various institutions that support economics of markets and politics of democracy, along with their roles and functions.*